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  • Yakkertech and PitchCom Join Forces In Exclusive Deal to Quantify Pitch Command

    Yakkertech and PitchCom Join Forces In Exclusive Deal to Quantify Pitch Command

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

    February 3, 2023

    Phoenix, AZ – Yakkertech, a leading provider of in-game optical ball-flight data for the baseball and softball industry, and PitchCom, the innovative device that is best known for its use by Major League Baseball pitchers and catchers, are announcing today that they have entered an exclusive partnership to create the first-ever quantifiable measure of Pitcher Command.

    The capability of a pitcher to meticulously place pitches with intention, commonly referred to as Pitcher Command, constitutes a vital facet of the sport. However, its accurate evaluation has historically proven to be a challenging task. With the advent of PitchCom and Yakkertech technologies, teams will now be equipped with a data-driven methodology to appraise Pitcher Command by determining the intended location and final location of each pitch thrown. Using BaseballCloud’s flagship software, users will then be able to automate this process and visualize their findings on a single platform. 

    The PitchCom and Yakkertech partnership will revolutionize command metrics by automatically calculating intended and observed pitch locations.

    “We are thrilled to be partnering PitchCom’s game-changing system with Yakkertech and BaseballCloud’s industry-leading technologies,” said PitchCom’s Owner, John Hankins. “Our collaboration to create a new patent-pending system combining PitchCom’s intended location with Yakkertech’s ball-flight data will revolutionize pitcher evaluation and development at all levels.”

    The process is simple and efficient. Using PitchCom’s earpiece and keypad, the catcher can send pitch calls to the pitcher, including the pitch type and intended location. Yakkertech’s cameras log each pitch and cross-reference them with the signal transmitted by the catcher through PitchCom. This information is then analyzed to determine the pitcher’s command, providing teams with a valuable tool to grade performance and make relevant adjustments based on the frequency, direction, and distance of misses.

    PitchCom is approved and used by MLB organizations and is available for colleges across the country.

    “Our partnership with PitchCom is a game-changer for the baseball and softball industry. We are able to create a new metric,” said Kevin Davidson, CEO of Yakkertech and BaseballCloud. “As a former catcher, I know as well as anyone how important this aspect of the game is. Being able to objectively track it for the first time is a huge step forward for the two sports.”

    This joint venture is tailored for use across all levels of baseball and softball, from independent professional baseball leagues to high school programs and training facilities. Teams with a Yakkertech system and a PitchCom device will be able to utilize these features as soon as the 2023 season, and users of the upcoming Yakkertech portable system will be able to take advantage in the near future. 

    “Having this information at your fingertips is truly performance-enhancing for coaches and players. ‘Command’ separates good pitchers from great ones, and now we have a whole new way to see this side of the game,” said World Series Champion Outfielder Jonny Gomes.

    LSU Pitching Coach Wes Johnson echoed this excitement for the deal and talked about what this means for his pitchers: “The technology Yakkertech, BaseballCloud, and PitchCom are using to quantify command will change the way pitchers are evaluated! This will revolutionize the way coaches look at pitchers moving forward.”

    BaseballCloud will continue to develop industry-leading analysis tools and visuals including Command Reports inside of our AnalyzR solution.

    About Yakkertech™ and BaseballCloud™:

    BaseballCloud™  offers a revolutionary suite of tools to empower baseball and softball players at all levels to optimize performance. The company’s flagship product, Yakkertech™, is an optical-tracking system that captures and analyzes ball-flight data with unparalleled precision. Alongside Yakkertech™, BaseballCloud™  is a leader in shaping the future of the sport with cutting-edge technologies for player development, scouting, and fan engagement.

    About PitchCom™:

    The PitchCom™ communication system uses a proprietary push-button, player-wearable transmitter that allows players on the field to communicate plays to each other without using physical signs or verbal communication. Every player wearing a receiver actually hears the same instructions in their very own chosen language. The PitchCom™ communication system, a patent-pending technology of PitchCom Sports™, can also be adapted to allow coaches to communicate with players in the same covert manner.

    For more information, please contact info@baseballcloud.com.

    February 3, 2023
    Press Release
    PR
  • Introduction to bcWAR: SEC Position Player Rankings

    Introduction to bcWAR: SEC Position Player Rankings

    In the sabermetric era of baseball, the statistic “WAR” has become the overarching determinant of a player’s value. WAR, which stands for Wins Above Replacement, measures the value of a player’s production while putting it in terms of how many wins they generate above a replacement-level player. It is important to note that this replacement-level player is not whoever falls next on the depth chart, but rather a theoretical estimation of how a standard replacement would produce. While player evaluation is a rather nuanced science, WAR is a strong estimator of value that comes in an easily-interpretable form. 

    We decided that it is essential to design a College Baseball WAR metric that focuses offensive production, defensive position, and strength of schedule. To demonstrate our WAR metric in practice, below lies a list of the Top 10 SEC Position Players in bcWAR last season. bcWAR is scaled to 162 games (the length of the Major League Baseball season), so a bcWAR of 2.0 can be interpreted as the following:  

    “Player X was worth 2 wins more than a theoretical replacement-level player over the course of a 162-game season” 

    Without further ado, here are the Top 10 SEC Position Players in 2022 bcWAR! 

    10. Spencer Jones, Vanderbilt, OF/INF (3.6 bcWAR) 

    After a demoralizing stretch of injuries, Spencer Jones put it all together last season. The 6’7” lefty posted a remarkable .370/.460/.643 slash line with 12 bombs, 14 stolen bases, and 60 runs batted in. Although we did not see the same firepower from the Commodores that we are used to seeing, Jones helped lead them to a decisive winner-takes-all game against Oregon State in their regional. Despite falling to the Beavers 7-6 in that final game, Jones made his mark on the game by sending a 3-2 changeup over the right field fence to put Vanderbilt on the board. 

    While bcWAR is a reflection of production stats, Jones’ underlying peripherals suggest that his performance was no fluke. Jones posted a 65% Hard Hit rate last season, which falls 10% above the Division I average. Perhaps Jones’ most impressive figure is the 100mph average exit velocity he posted against breaking balls last season. Numbers like these are likely part of the reason that the Yankees selected Jones in the first round of the 2022 draft. Upon the selection, Yankees fans quickly compared Jones to another tall slugger named Aaron Judge. While this comparison may be ambitious, it is easy to see why a fanbase should get excited over having a guy like Jones in their system. 

    https://twitter.com/VandyBoys/status/1524230921792098304?s=20&t=RffKmuHtFTalayJSJonrpQ

    9. Dominic Keegan, Vanderbilt, OF/INF (3.6 bcWAR) 

    Slotting in at #9 on the list is Jones’ teammate, Dominic Keegan. Keegan made the decision to return to school for his senior season after being selected by the Yankees in the 19th round of the 2021 MLB draft. His decision paid off handsomely. Keegan’s final season was his best by a comfortable margin, setting career highs in batting average, on-base percentage, slugging percentage, and runs batted in. 

    Keegan may not hit the ball quite as hard as Jones, although his exit velocity numbers are still strong. The biggest improvement in Keegan’s game came in the strikeout department. Despite tallying more plate appearances in 2022 than 2021, Keegan struck out 23 fewer times. Quality of contact is certainly important, but sometimes people underestimate the value of quantity of contact. Keegan gambled on himself by returning to school, and he was rewarded with a 4th-round draft selection from the Tampa Bay Rays. 

    https://twitter.com/VandyBoys/status/1526733404351303680?s=20&t=RffKmuHtFTalayJSJonrpQ

    8. Jacob Gonzalez, Ole Miss, INF (3.9 bcWAR) 

    All eyes have been on Gonzalez since he set foot in Oxford, and boy has he exceeded everyone’s expectations. Gonzalez’s freshman season garnered the attention of MLB scouts country-wide. In 67 games played, he recorded a .355/.443/.672 slash line. While he may have taken a slight step back last season with regard to his holistic statistical production, he displayed improvement in areas that will certainly appeal to professional organizations. In fewer plate appearances, Gonzalez raised his home run total from 12 to 18, and his walk total from 38 to 50.  

    Gonzalez is an athletic freak who is quite difficult to get out. It is rather uncommon to see a true shortstop post a .682 slugging percentage with 18 more walks than strikeouts in the SEC. The biggest success of Gonzalez‘s sophomore campaign occurred in Omaha, as the Rebels were crowned as the 2022 NCAA Division I Champions. With one more season remaining before he becomes draft eligible, Gonzalez will look to build on his already-illustrious collegiate career.  

    https://twitter.com/TheAthletic/status/1541163323386888192?s=20&t=RffKmuHtFTalayJSJonrpQ

    7. Austin Bost, Texas A&M, OF/INF (4.0 bcWAR) 

    Bost’s 2022 campaign was his best one yet, as he paced the entire SEC in hits during conference play. Bost isn’t your standard slap hitter who only racks up singles. Bost hit double-digit homers for the second consecutive season, while setting a career-high of 14 doubles. This impressive combination of hitting for average and hitting for power is buoyed by much-improved plate discipline. After running a 34:12 K:BB ratio in 2021, he cut his strikeouts to 29 while boosting his walks to a lofty 34.  

    Bost set Aggie nation ablaze by announcing that he plans on returning to College Station for one more season. It was a successful 2022 season for Texas A&M, as they battled all the way to Omaha before falling to the Oklahoma Sooners. The outlook is bright for next season, and Bost is set to lead the way for the hopeful Aggie squad. 

    https://twitter.com/11point7/status/1508997700385189894?s=20&t=RffKmuHtFTalayJSJonrpQ

    6. Jacob Berry, LSU, INF (4.0 bcWAR) 

    Berry began his remarkable college career down in Tuscon, Arizona. In his first and only season for the Wildcats, Berry posted a remarkable 1.115 OPS while solidifying a spot on the Pac-12 All-Conference Team. Berry opted to transfer to LSU for his sophomore season. Expectations were high for the switch hitter entering Baton Rouge, but he quickly showed Tiger fans why he generated so much buzz. Berry slashed .370/.464/.630 while slicing his strikeout rate in half. 

    It is rather fitting that Berry falls in at #6 on this list, as the Marlins selected him with the 6th overall pick in the 2022 MLB Draft. Berry’s exit velocities may not stand out all the time, but he has an advanced ability to spray line drives. Berry has shown little issue barreling up fastballs. The next step for him as a hitter is producing similar quality of contact against breaking balls and off-speed pitches, especially as he faces higher-level pitching. While some question if he will stick at the hot corner long-term, few question the potential that he possesses at the plate. 

    https://twitter.com/LSUbaseball/status/1517311648872099841?s=20&t=RffKmuHtFTalayJSJonrpQ

    5. Dylan Rock, Texas A&M, OF (4.2 bcWAR) 

    After a stellar four years at the University of Texas-San Antonio, Rock traveled a short distance to play his final collegiate season in College Station. Rock had no issue winning over the Aggie fanbase, as he paced the team in runs scored, runs batted in, and homers. On top of Rock’s tremendous power, he put together an impressive 18% walk rate. When Rock reached first, he often felt that he wanted more. The 6’1” righty swiped 16 bags last season as well. 

    The word that scouts frequently used to describe Rock was “toolsy”. He possesses a rare combination of power, plate discipline, the ability to hit for average, speed, and defense. The term “toolsy” is often used to describe players who are talented but have yet to put it together. Rock does not fall into that category. In his lone season as an Aggie, he showed the country that he can produce at a high level. He also showed the Toronto Blue Jays, who selected him in the 8th round of the 2022 Draft. 

    https://twitter.com/AggieBaseball/status/1533851133084565505?s=20&t=RffKmuHtFTalayJSJonrpQ

    4. Dylan Crews, LSU, OF (4.6 bcWAR) 

    Many were shocked that Dylan Crews even made it to Baton Rouge, but boy are Tiger fans glad that he did. Crews is a stud. After a 1.116 OPS freshman year, Crews found a way to improve in 2022. His .349/.463/.691 slash line earned him Co-Sec Player of the Year honors. Crews ran a .374 batting average on balls in play least season, which some may view as a sign of future regression. However, given his mature ability to spray line drives to all fields, he should have no issue maintaining high success rates on batted balls. 

    Crews hits the ball hard. His 66% Hard Hit rate ranked him among the elite bats across the country. Entering his likely-final season in Baton Rouge, Crews is on the shortlist for the prestigious Golden Spikes Award. Moreover, when the 2023 MLB Draft comes around, there won’t be many hitters (if any at all) who hear their name called before Crews. He projects to have a long and fruitful career in this game.

    https://twitter.com/LSUbaseball/status/1497372748980502528?s=20&t=RffKmuHtFTalayJSJonrpQ

    3. Wyatt Langford, Florida, OF/C (4.7 bcWAR)

    Wyatt Langford is a jack of all trades. How many players do you see labeled as an outfielder and a catcher? Most of the Florida MLB Draft attention this past year revolved around outfielders Jud Fabian and Sterlin Thompson. Thompson was snatched up by the Colorado Rockies with the 31st pick, while Fabian fell to the Baltimore Orioles’ pick at #67. What if I told you that a different Gator outfielder paced the team in batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging percentage? 

    That outfielder goes by the name of Wyatt Langford. After a rather non-existent freshman season, Langford burst onto the scene last year in a huge way. Langford posted an absurd 70% Hard Hit rate, which beats Crews by 4%. Hitting the ball hard certainly helped Langford lead the SEC in homers with a whopping 26. Langford has played himself into conversations regarding the first overall pick in the 2023 draft. One quick glance at his statistical profile and it’s easy to see why. 

    https://twitter.com/GatorsBB/status/1532434017085181999?s=20&t=RffKmuHtFTalayJSJonrpQ

    2. Trey Lipscomb, Tennessee, INF (4.8 bcWAR) 

    The Tennessee Volunteers were historically good last year. The Vols went 57-9 last season. No other SEC team lost fewer than 20 games. They may not have raised the trophy in Omaha, but they were certainly the most dominant team in the country for most of the season. While it was a true team effort, Lipscomb was their most productive offensive player. The third baseman posted a .355/.428/.717 slash line, while leading the dynamic Vols in homers.  

    The senior leader was scooped up in the third round of the draft by the Washington Nationals. Lipscomb’s statistical portfolio was more than enough to warrant high interest from MLB clubs, but there was more to the picture than that. A winning culture is brewing in Knoxville that was a rather unfamiliar sight. The Vols had experienced a dry spell over the past two decades that had seen little success within the SEC. Turning the program around was not the result of one man’s work, but Lipscomb surely played a role in establishing a winning culture. 

    https://twitter.com/Vol_Baseball/status/1517641952342142976?s=20&t=RffKmuHtFTalayJSJonrpQ

    1. Sonny DiChiara, Auburn, INF (5.4 bcWAR) 

    Every conversation about offensive production in the SEC must start and finish with Sonny DiChiara. After three strong seasons at Samford University, DiChiara transferred to Auburn for his senior year. His numbers were simply off the charts. Who led the SEC in batting average last season? Sonny DiChiara. On-Base Percentage? Sonny DiChiara. Slugging Percentage? You guessed it. Sonny DiChiara. The righty slugger put together one of the most impressive offensive seasons in SEC history, splitting Co-SEC Player of the Year honors with Crews.  

    Despite the overarching narrative that DiChiara likely projects as a designated hitter at the next level, the Angels selected him in the 5th round of the 2022 Draft. Even if his defensive value is minimal, his offensive upside is through the roof. DiChiara also led the SEC in walks. His discipline at the plate is well beyond that of a college-level hitter. Teams were cautious to pitch to him, which certainly makes sense. DiChiara played like a man amongst boys last season, and his offensive upside at the next level is sky high. 

    https://twitter.com/AuburnBaseball/status/1529560003690090496?s=20&t=RffKmuHtFTalayJSJonrpQ
    September 19, 2022
    College Baseball, MLB Baseball, MLB Draft
  • The Jordan Hicks Dilemma: A Quantitative Analysis of Pitch Tunneling, Arsenal Coherence, and Stuff-Based Evaluation

    The Jordan Hicks Dilemma: A Quantitative Analysis of Pitch Tunneling, Arsenal Coherence, and Stuff-Based Evaluation

    The Dilemma

    I believe that we have been looking at pitch quality all wrong. Many mathematical models designed to evaluate a pitcher’s stuff have been misdirected. These heavy claims are baseless without evidence, but in this piece, I plan on exploring a massive shortcoming with traditional stuff analysis, and how we can change that. We often see pitchers with A-Grade stuff on paper who struggle to translate that to strong in-game results. Our knee-jerk response is to blame their command. While this may be a valid explanation for some pitchers, it is rarely the main reason for the discrepancy between stuff and performance. Instead, the main reason revolves around a shortcoming with traditional stuff analysis.

    Ever since the dawn of the pitch tracking era, pitchers have sought higher spin rates in order to induce more movement on their pitches. After all, why wouldn’t they? We’ve all seen these nasty breaking balls spin north of 3000 RPM. The hitter expects the pitch to land over the heart of the plate before it takes a sharp turn in a different direction. MLB pitchers have learned to manipulate the baseball in ways that previously could have only been achieved with a wiffle ball.  

    To exemplify my point about wiffle-ball-esque pitches, I will point to a pitcher whose stuff on paper appears to be fresh out of a video game. Jordan Hicks of the St. Louis Cardinals might possess the single-most nasty two-pitch mix in MLB history. He is known for having touched 105mph on his sinker. That sinker runs 16 inches, and his slider sweeps 12 inches. A 28-inch horizontal movement differential combined with historical velocity must make Hicks unhittable. Right? 

    Somehow, the results don’t seem to agree. This is Hicks’ second straight season with an ERA above 5.00. He only strikes out 23% of hitters while walking 16%. Ah! There it is! Hicks must be another example of a flame-thrower with generational stuff who is plagued by an inability to throw strikes. Except… he’s not. This season, Hicks has thrown 42% of his pitches in the strike zone. Out of 587 pitchers who have thrown at least 10 innings in 2022, Hicks ranks 270th in zone rate. His ability to throw strikes is quite literally average. How does a pitcher with an average zone rate have a walk rate that ranks in the 1st percentile? The answer is simple. Jordan Hicks cannot generate strikes on pitches out of the strike zone.  

    You may think that the last sentence is hyperbolic, but it is not. Only three pitchers in Major League Baseball have lower chase rates than Hicks. How is that possible? Hicks throws gas with a ton of movement. How does he not induce chases?  

    If a batter were to swing at a randomly-generated Jordan Hicks slider, there is a 50% chance that the batter whiffs. The issue is that batters don’t swing very often at Jordan Hicks sliders. Specifically, they swing at a mere 38% of them, and that figure plummets to 27% on sliders out of the zone. It is quite difficult to generate a strike on a pitch out of the strike zone if hitters don’t swing at it. Hicks’ issue is rather clear and far from uncommon. His pitch mix generates too much movement. 

    Yes, you read that correctly. Hicks’ 28-inch horizontal break differential between his two pitches is counterproductive. To understand why this is, we must first understand ball flight. There comes a point in a pitch’s journey from the pitcher’s hand to the catcher’s glove where the hitter must make his swing decision. This is a product of pitch velocity, pitch location, bat speed, hitter reaction time, among other factors. When Hicks throws a slider with 12 inches of sweep, the pitch likely begins to sweep earlier than a slider with 4 inches of sweep. While there is such a thing as “late break” and it can be quantified through measures of seam-shifted wake, I am only referring to movement induced by Magnus spin.  

    The issue is that Hicks is unable to form an effective tunnel between his sinker and slider. The two pitches diverge from their tunnel earlier than pitches with smaller movement differentials, and based on Hicks’ abhorrent chase rates, I speculate that the two pitches become detectable before the hitter makes his swing decision. The moment a hitter sees arm-side run, they know it is a sinker. The moment a hitter sees glove-side sweep, they know it is a slider. Given the large magnitude of each, the hitter can detect the pitch type early on in the pitch’s flight.  

    I use Hicks as an example, but he is far from the only pitcher with this issue. Within the baseball analytics community, there seems to be an infatuation towards sweepers, such as the one Hicks possesses. Sweepers are slider-variants with minimal spin-induced break on the vertical plane, and a ton of glove-side sweep. Hicks’ 12-inch sweeper certainly falls in that category, but we’ve seen sweepers touch the 20-inch mark.

    Many pitchers waltz into pitching labs and attempt to garner as much sweep as possible on their slider, thinking they’re developing a nasty pitch. But is this truly beneficial? Does the pitch fit within the rest of the pitcher’s arsenal? I don’t want to leave you with the impression that sweepers are bad per se, but I will confidently state that they are pitches that should be thrown by a select number of pitchers. 

    A strong example of a pitcher who excels with a sweeper is none other than Shohei Ohtani. Ohtani’s sweeper averages 14 inches of sweep, which may seem like too much based on the Jordan Hicks example, but it is not. 45% of Ohtani’s sweepers result in a called strike or a whiff. That statistic lies at 23% for Hicks. 50% of Ohtani’s sweepers generate a swing, compared to 37% for Hicks. One might naturally assume that the reason Ohtani’s sweeper is more effective is that he throws more than two pitches, but that is not the main reason. Ohtani actually throws his sweeper 6% more than Hicks does. Technically speaking, Ohtani’s sweeper is his primary pitch.  

    The reason Shohei is able to succeed with a sweeper is because of his fastball. Ohtani throws a low spin efficiency four-seamer than only generates three-inches of run. Despite generating more sweep on his slider, his fastball-slider horizontal movement differential is only 17 inches—11 fewer than Hicks. The two pitches form a tunnel that is far more effective than Hicks’ sinker-slider combination. 

    The Truth About Breaking Balls

    I recently published an article on the relationship between fastball stuff characteristics and fastball utility. While I was conducting a similar analysis for breaking balls, I discovered a rather telling conclusion.

    This plot is based on 2022 NCAA Division I Yakkertech data. It illustrates a logistic regression model I made that outputs the expected chase rate on a breaking ball based on stuff characteristics. It is important to note that each of these breaking balls is treated as if they exist in a vacuum. They are not relative to the rest of the pitcher’s arsenal. Any negative horizontal movement represents glove-side sweep, and any negative induced vertical break represents spin-induced drop.  

    It is glaringly evident that breaking balls with a ton of sweep and drop are rarely effective as chase pitches. Some mega sweepers can be effective, but this only works effectively if the pitcher’s fastball does not run a lot. Ohtani is an example of a pitcher with an effective sweeper, but he possesses a rare fastball that allows it to work. I believe there are six types of breaking balls: cutters, slutters, gyro sliders, sweepers, slurves, and 12-6 curves. The two that appear to be the most effective are the cutters and the gyro sliders. Interestingly, these are the two variants that often see the least spin-induced movement.  

    I am not saying that there is no purpose to throwing breakers with a ton of spin-induced movement. Quite the contrary. There is a rather valuable purpose. 

    This plot appears to be the polar opposite of the prior one. It represents the expected likelihood of inducing a swing on a middle-middle breaking ball. The lower the probability, the more effective the pitch as a called strike generator. Loopy breakers with double-digit inches of drop and sweep can reach expected middle-middle swing rates as low as 40%. So, please do not leave with the belief that loopy breakers are bad. They may be ineffective at generating chases, but they are remarkably effective called strike pitches. Throw them in the zone, not out of it.  

    I’ve focused on horizontal differentials thus far, but I would argue that vertical differentials are more indicative of tunneling prowess. To analyze vertical movement in this article, I will be citing long-form vertical movement instead of the traditional short-form induced vertical break that is shown in the plots above. I chose to use long-form movement because it represents the magnitude of drop that a pitch exhibits as a result of spin and velocity. I find this metric more useful when referencing vertical movement differentials because it incorporates spin-induced drop and velocity-based drop.  

    While too much separation between two pitches is evidently detrimental, the opposite exists as well. Padres Lefty Sean Manaea’s two most-used pitches are his sinker and his changeup. Unfortunately for Manaea, his changeup has been the 5th worst changeup in MLB this season per run value. After glancing at its movement profile, I can’t say I’m surprised. The pitch drops only 11 inches more than his sinker, while running 0.2 inches less. This is not enough separation! Even if it takes the hitter longer to visually differentiate the two pitches, they are able to guess wrong and still be successful. Manaea’s changeup woes are not uncommon for sinker-ballers. It is easier to separate a four-seam and changeup than a sinker and changeup. 

    We have established that too large of a movement differential is ineffective, and too little of a movement differential is ineffective, so what is effective? There exists a sweet-spot differential that catalyzes an effective tunnel while still differentiating the movement profile. Now we have reached the hard part: finding that sweet-spot.

    The Vertical Movement Sweet-Spot

    To determine the ideal vertical movement differential, I looked at drop differentials between a pitcher’s primary fastball and their breaking ball(s). I opted to use chase rate as the metric that would benefit the most from a strong tunnel. It seemed appropriate, as chase rate measures the ability to induce a wrong swing decision.

    I soon realized that breaking balls and off-speed pitches would need to be separated, as they possess different, albeit similar sweet-spots. For breaking balls, I limited the sample to breakers with fewer than 17 inches of horizontal break differential off of the fastball, as to somewhat control for extreme horizontal breakers. Among these breaking balls, here are the conclusions I drew: 

    1. The vertical drop differential sweet-spot is between 16 and 26 inches. 
    1. Among breaking balls with top quartile chase rates, 54% fall in this sweet-spot. 
    1. Among breaking balls with bottom quartile chase rates, 36% fall in this sweet-spot. 
    1. The average chase rate of breaking balls that fall in this sweet-spot is 33%. 
    1. The average chase rate of breaking balls that do not fall in this sweet-spot is 30%. 

    These may not seem like extreme differences, but they are significant. a 30% chase rate falls in the 59th percentile. A 33% chase rate falls in the 85th percentile. The value of throwing a breaker in that sweet-spot is tremendous if the pitch is to be used as a chase pitch. It is important to remember that this sweet-spot is not a hard-gated fence. Breakers with 14 inches of drop differential should not be treated the same as breakers with 40 inches of drop differential. Edwin Diaz has one of the most effective sliders in Major League Baseball, and he only records 14 inches of drop differential. It is very possible to have an effective breaking ball that does not fall within this range. However, this is the range that appears to create the most effective tunnels with one’s primary fastball. 

    Here are the ten breaking balls with the highest whiff-per-pitch rates, with their vertical drop separation from their primary fastball in parenthesis. 

    1. Jacob deGrom SL (14.9) 
    1. Andrew Chafin SL (19.6) 
    1. Edwin Diaz SL (14.2) 
    1. Dylan Lee CU (22.8) 
    1. Ryan Pressly SL (18.3) 
    1. Liam Hendriks SL(20.5) 
    1. Dominic Leone SL (26.0) 
    1. Andres Muñoz SL (16.1) 
    1. Tanner Rainey SL (22.5) 
    1. Ryan Helsley SL (22.7) 

    Every one of these breaking balls falls in the sweet-spot except for deGrom’s and Diaz’s, and even those two aren’t too far out of it. deGrom and Diaz also excel on the horizontal break plane as well, which we will dive into shortly. Within the range, it appears that the closer one can come to a 20-inch differential, the better off they are. 

    The plot below demonstrates that a drop differential between 10 and 30 inches gives one a strong chance at inducing chases. Any smaller than 10 and any larger than 30 makes it a lot more difficult. I chose 16-26 inches to be the sweet-spot, because this is where we see the majority of elite breaking balls.  

    To prove the importance of creating a fastball-breaker drop differential in this range, I will point to a Major League example. In fact, I will point to a starting pitcher without an elite fastball who instantly improved with a slight modification to his slider. Angels Starter Reid Detmers throws a fastball that is not necessarily bad. I think average might be a better word to describe it. Prior to his demotion to AAA in late June, he had yet to see sustained Major League success. Up to that point, the only consistency that his slider had shown lied in the fact that it was consistently different every start, as I tweeted in July.  

    https://twitter.com/MaxwellResnick/status/1553787007280861184

    Detmers’ fastball drops 14 inches. Based on what we have learned so far, he should search for a slider with between 30-40 inches of drop. The plot below shows Detmers’ vertical drop on his slider in each start this season. I placed a dotted blue line at the 34-inch benchmark, which represents 20 inches of vertical drop differential from his fastball.

    A proper fastball-slider tunnel was non-existent early in Detmers’ season. Once June hit, he began to discover something stronger, but it still lacked consistency. Now, in August, Detmers has found one of the most lethal secondary offerings in the game of baseball. His slider chase rate in the month of August lies at 50%. For reference, it was 17% in April. One might think that the succeeding sentence is an exaggeration, but I truly believe it. Detmers’ ability to find a slider that creates a proper tunnel with his fastball turned him from a back-of-the-rotation guy to an elite starting pitcher.  

    Unfortunately, not everyone has found the same success as Detmers. White Sox Righty Michael Kopech has long been considered one of the more electric players in the game of baseball, mostly due to his elite fastball. At the Major-League level, his fastball has performed exactly how everyone expected. However, he has yet to burst into the upper-echelon of pitchers due to his inability to develop a strong secondary. His slider is a prime example of a pitch with a differential that is too large. He generates 29 inches of drop differential between his fastball and slider, which is outside of the sweet-spot range, and a far cry from the ideal mark of 20 inches. This same slider records a whiff under 10% of the time. Why is that?  

    As we discussed earlier, the two pitch types likely become detectable before the hitter is forced to make his swing decision. I call this a short tunnel. Even if the pitches start on the same plane, it does not take long for them to break off. Kopech could realistically burst into the elite tier of pitchers if he can develop a harder breaking ball that drops less. A slight modification could be career-altering for him. He is not alone in that category. There are many other elite fastball-throwers whose lack of secondary offerings hold them back from reaching their full potential.  

    I ran a similar procedure for fastball-changeup combinations (splitters are grouped in with changeups), and here are the conclusions I drew: 

    1. The vertical drop differential sweet-spot does not really exist. As a general principle, more drop separation between fastball and changeup bodes well for pitchers. However, the number that appears to be the pre-requisite for changeup success is 14. 
    1. Among off-speed pitches with top quartile chase rates, 57% have more than 14 inches of vertical separation. 
    1. Among off-speed pitches with bottom quartile chase rates, 48% have more than 14 inches of vertical separation. 
    1. The average chase rate of off-speed pitches with more than 14 inches of separation is 38.3%. 
    1. The average chase rate of off-speed pitches with fewer than 14 inches of separation is 35.8%. 

    Admittedly, these results are less extreme than that of breaking balls. However, they are certainly not insignificant. The reason there is less extremity is due to the smaller range of drop differentials among off-speeds compared to breakers. The standard deviation of fastball-changeup vertical drop differential is 4.7. The standard deviation of fastball-breaker vertical drop differential is 9.9. This makes sense in theory. As I stated earlier, there are six breaking ball variants. The only two off-speed variants are changeups and splitters, and even those two usually perform similarly. 

    Although the data did not show an upper limit to ideal vertical drop separation with off-speeds, one likely exists. Pitchers have yet to reach it. I imagine that if a pitcher got 50 inches of separation between their fastball and changeup, the two pitches would not tunnel very well. However, the realistic maximum we have seen is around 30 inches, and that differential appears to be effective.  

    Earlier in this piece, I referenced Sean Manaea as an example of a pitcher who struggles to separate his fastball and changeup. This is a very common issue for those who throw sinkers as their primary fastball. Sinkers possess short-form movement profiles similar to changeups, so the only real separator is velocity. For this reason, I would advise sinker-ballers to explore slower changeups with fastball-like arm speed, Manaea included.  

    I want to talk about one of Manaea’s teammates as an example of this velocity differential. Padres Righty Nick Martinez has a rather standard blueprint for pitching. Sinker-cutter combination to righties, four-seam-changeup combination to lefties, and a loopy curveball to mix in once and while. Oftentimes, pitchers with this blueprint throw poor four-seams, but they fear that if they nix the four-seam, their changeup success will plummet due to a killed tunnel. Martinez is no different. Every pitch of his has performed at an above-average level this season, except for his four-seam, which possesses an abysmal run value of 8. He must throw it to avoid killing the changeup, though. Right? 

    Martinez’s changeup is a unicorn pitch. He throws it 14mph slower than his four-seamer, and imparts 13 fewer inches of spin-induced break on it. His changeup drops 25 inches more than his four-seamer. This exceptional vertical separation is the main reason his changeup is so successful, so limiting four-seam usage would likely have a negative effect on the changeup. But the 21 inches of drop differential between Martinez’s sinker and changeup is still very strong. I am not recommending that Martinez ditches the four-seam altogether, but he has less reason to be fearful of it than many similar pitchers, due to the large velocity differentials between his two fastballs and his changeup. 

    Before moving on, I would like to clarify that spin-induced drop should always be preferred over velocity-induced drop. Although they may produce similar pitch shapes, velocity is the key determinant of a hitter’s reaction time to swing. Creating large separation without over-extending a hitter’s time to make his swing decision is essential. Yankees Reliever Ron Marinaccio owns one of the most potent changeups in the game. His vertical drop differential from his fastball is nearly 24 inches, which far surpasses the 14-inch benchmark. He achieves this massive separation with a 15-inch induced vertical break differential that few pitchers are able to achieve.

    The Horizontal Movement Sweet-Spot

    Horizontal break is certainly less complicated than vertical break, due to the absence of gravity. As we all know from existing on Earth, gravity does not operate on the horizontal plane, so there is no variation in short-form and long-form horizontal break.  

    As I did in the vertical drop section, I decided to look at the breaking balls in Major League Baseball with the highest swinging-strike rates. I analyzed the horizontal movement differential between said breaking ball and that pitcher’s primary fastball. The results were jarring. Before sharing them, I want to establish that the width of the strike zone is 17 inches. 

    1. Not a single breaking ball in the top 20 of swinging-strike rate had more than 17 inches of horizontal separation off of its primary fastball. 
    1. Not a single breaking ball in the top 35 of swinging-strike rate had more than 20 inches of horizontal separation off of its primary fastball. 
    1. Among those top 35, 10 breaking balls had fewer than 10 inches of horizontal separation off of its primary fastball. 
    1. Among those top 35, 21 breaking balls fell between 10-17 inches of horizontal separation off of its primary fastball. 

    Remember the opening of this piece when I analyzed the Jordan Hicks dilemma? Well, Jordan Hicks is not alone. The breaking balls that are most successful at inducing swinging strikes do not distance themselves from their fastball by more than 20 inches. Even 20 inches is flirting with the devil. I would deem the sweet-spot to be within 6-16 inches. Believe it or not, I would rather be within 6 inches of separation than beyond 16 inches of separation, unless the pitcher also throws an intermediate pitch to bridge the gap. 

    Once again, do not walk away from this article believing that sweepers have no value. Sweepers approach the plate at a very sharp horizontal angle, making them difficult to barrel. Hitters struggle to gauge where a sweeper will land horizontally. However, if a mega-sweeper is paired with a running fastball, hitters will lay off the breaker. Hicks is not alone. 

    I want to provide a counterexample to Hicks. So far, we have established that an ideal fastball-breaker tunnel is formed with 16-26 inches of vertical drop separation and 6-16 horizontal break separation. Braves Starter Charlie Morton has a five-pitch arsenal, but he throws two of those pitches way more than the other three: his fastball and curveball. On the surface, the two should not tunnel well. They are separated by 34 inches of vertical drop and 26 inches of horizontal break—both of which are way beyond their respective sweet-spots. Nonetheless, Morton’s curveball possesses a 36% chase rate, which is comfortably above average for breaking balls. 

    How does he do this? Although Morton primarily relies on two pitches, he also throws a cutter 10% of the time.  

    Pitch Type  Usage  Vertical Drop  Horizontal Break 
    Fastball  34%  18  10 
    Cutter  10%  32  -2 
    Curveball  38%  53  -16 

    Although the fastball and curveball do not create an ideal tunnel, the cutter bridges the gap. The fastball and cutter create a strong tunnel, and the cutter and curveball create a strong tunnel. As a result, the presence of the cutter helps bridge the gap between Morton’s two primary offerings. My best advice to a hitter facing Morton would be to pretend the cutter doesn’t exist. This may sound facetious, but it is not. You are better off fixating on the fastball-curveball combination that does not tunnel well, and if he beats you with the cutter, you may tip your cap on your long walk back to the dugout.  

    In the case of Reid Detmers, his path to developing a strong tunnel revolved around slider renovation. He took a pitch in his arsenal and crafted it to fit his fastball. Morton could have done the same, but his curveball has been his most lethal weapon for his entire career. Instead, he developed a cutter that bridged the gap between his fastball and curveball. This is another feasible and effective method of engineering an effective tunnel. 

    What conclusions can we draw from my exploration of horizontal break separation between fastballs and breaking balls? Believe it or not, I see no evidence that more separation is better. I should establish that a breaking ball should not have the exact same movement profile as a four-seam fastball. However, this is not an issue that Major League pitchers face. As long as there is approximately 6 inches of horizontal separation, I see little evidence that suggests that more is better.  

    Breaking balls that induce swinging strikes appear to do so by dropping below the bat, instead of trying to miss the end of the bat. This makes sense in theory, considering that bats are far longer than they are wide. It is a lot easier to induce a straight whiff by missing over or under the bat than by surpassing the length of the bat. For this reason, I would always recommend prioritizing vertical tunnels over horizontal tunnels, at least for the purpose of inducing whiffs. Does the same hold true for changeups? 

    It does. There is not a strong relationship between fastball-changeup horizontal separation. Many pitchers see success with running changeups, such as Brandon Woodruff and Shane McClanahan. Others see success with changeups that barely run more than their fastball. Notable sinker-baller Logan Webb throws a changeup with half as much run as his sinker.  

    The best way to view fastball-changeup separation is through a coordinate plane. If a pitcher were to plot their fastball on a long-form movement coordinate plane, they should strive to, within reason, maximize the Pythagorean distance between their fastball and changeup. The pitcher should first prioritize vertical separation. Once they feel as if they’ve maximized the drop differential, any additional run is a solid bonus. 

    Although I have claimed that the pitcher’s goal should be to maximize fastball-changeup separation, an upper limit does exist. Simply put, pitchers have yet to scrape this upper limit. We see fastball-slider combinations with 35 inches of horizontal break differential. We do not see anywhere near this magnitude with fastballs and changeups. Horizontal separation that reaches double digits is rare. I imagine that if pitchers were to achieve 30+ inches of horizontal separation between their fastball and changeup, it would be quite detrimental. However, within the limits of our current version of baseball, I have yet to see a pronounced upper limit. 

    I’ve spent the duration of this piece solely referring to a pitch’s ability to generate chases and miss bats. I have done this because I wholeheartedly believe that the ability to induce a chase and a whiff is the most valuable attribute a pitch can have. Nonetheless, there are other methods of recording outs. I theorize that horizontal separation could play a role in inducing weak contact.  

    Anyone who has ever held a baseball bat knows that the barrel of the bat produces the hardest contact. That might explain why there is a commonly-cited quality of contact metric titled “Barrel%”. The endcap of the bat and the handle of the bat do not produce favorable contact. Pitchers who operate predominantly on the horizontal movement plane likely attempt to reach these extremes of the bat, instead of trying to miss it altogether. The issue, as we saw with Hicks, is that too much movement will simply reduce the likelihood of a swing. It is rather difficult to induce weak contact if the bat never leaves the hitter’s shoulder. 

    I also want to talk about the most lethal pitch type on the planet: the splitter. Splitters are dominant, and if they were easy to throw, everyone would do it. Those who do throw them often see remarkable success with them. Despite the infrequency of the pitch, 5 out of the top 8 off-speed pitches in swinging-strike rate are splitters. The reason I opted to bring up splitters in this section is because splitters rarely garner much horizontal separation from their corresponding fastball. In Yu Darvish’s case, his splitter runs less than his fastball (which isn’t too uncommon).  

    Analysis & My Thoughts

    To fully analyze the effects of separating one’s fastball and breaking ball, I decided to create a very simple metric called “Tunneling Score”. Essentially, it sets the ideal separation as 20 inches of drop differential and 10 inches of horizontal differential, and measures how much a breaking ball strays from this ideality. The table below shows the 2022 leaders in fastball-breaker tunneling score, along with the chase rate of their breaking ball.

    Pitcher & Pitch  Vertical Separation  Horizontal Separation  Chase Rate 
    German Marquez CU  20.2  10.0  39.0% 
    Shane Bieber SL  20.0 10.9 41.2%
    Patrick Sandoval SL 20.3 10.7 42.1%
    Kyle Nelson SL 21.1 10.0 36.5%
    Blake Snell SL 18.7 9.6 40.8%
    Matt Foster SL 19.5 11.2 30.0%
    Scott Barlow SL 19.9 11.7 35.7%
    Taylor Clarke SL 19.2 9.0 33.8%
    Chris Stratton SL 18.2 9.9 39.2%
    Austin Gomber SL 19.5 11.4 30.6% 

    Every breaking ball in the top 10 of tunneling score owns a chase rate of at least 30%. The correlation between tunneling score and chase rate sits at 0.3. While this figure isn’t too extreme, I do believe that there is certainly a relationship between the two variables. There will always be exceptions, but I firmly believe that pitchers should strive to create that 20-10 differential if they intend to use their breaking ball as a chase pitch.

    I decided to calculate the distance between a pitcher’s fastball and changeup on a long-form graph through the Pythagorean formula. Although the relationship was not overwhelming it was existent. The changeups that were more separated from their corresponding fastball performed better. This supports everything we have discussed so far regarding the relationship between fastballs and changeups.

    I have dedicated the entirety of this piece to the relationship between fastballs and secondaries, but the truth is that secondaries can play off of other secondaries. There are several examples of pitchers who throw a slider and a curveball, but some of the elite starting pitchers utilize three glove-side movers. Gerrit Cole is a perfect example of this.

    The black lines that connect datapoint are used to represent an effective tunnel. His fastball and slider are separated by a 24 inches of drop and 15 inches of horizontal break, which catalyzes an in-zone fastball out-of-zone slider tunnel. His cutter and curve are separated by approximately 28 inches of drop. This is outside of the sweet-spot range that we previously established, but given the three levels of glove-side breakers, he is still able to use his curve as an effective pitch in and out of the zone. Shane Bieber is another ace who possesses a cutter, slider, and curveball. The ability to create tunnels between non-fastball offerings is all-the-more beneficial for the pitcher.

    In full disclosure, I used to possess the belief that pitchers with bad fastballs should ditch that bad fastball altogether. While this may be a fair solution for some pitchers, I neglected a key element of pitching in my prior analysis. That bad fastball often operates as a set-up pitch for a pitcher’s secondaries, and abandoning the fastball would likely have a negative effect on the rest of the arsenal.

    A good example of this is Patrick Sandoval of the Angels. Sandoval’s four-seam fastball is ineffective, regardless of how you want to look at it. The velocity is average at best, the shape is generic, it gets hit hard, and it generates an abysmal number of whiffs. He also throws a sinker, which doesn’t have great characteristics either, but it is more productive than the four-seamer.

    Sandoval makes his money with his slider and changeup. Both pitches generate a called strike or whiff above 30% of the time. How are they so successful? They tunnel perfectly off of the four-seamer. Maybe perfect is a stretch, but it isn’t far from it. Sandoval’s fastball and slider are separated by 20 inches vertically and 11 inches horizontally. Sandoval’s fastball and changeup are separated by 16 inches vertically and 10 inches horizontally. If he were to ditch the four-seam in favor of the sinker, he would ruin the elite tunneling effect he currently has in place.

    Sandoval’s upside will always be capped by the presence of a bad fastball, but he does a good job limiting that presence. His four-seamer is actually his tertiary pitch. He throws it 24% of the time, which is enough to create these elite tunnels, but not enough to cause irreparable damage to his production. As a general principle, pitchers in Sandoval’s shoes should strive to throw their four-seamer between 20%-30%. The recommended percentage obviously varies by circumstance, but the 20-30 range seems to work well for a lot of similar pitchers.

    Conclusion

    It is time to rethink pitch design. Trust me. I do not subscribe to the old-school belief that a pitcher must “establish his fastball”. I am, in fact, an advocate of throwing your best pitches more. However, with a few exceptions, I believe that pitchers should craft their breaking balls and off-speed pitches off of their fastball. 

    The reason I say this is because the fastball is the least malleable pitch. Outside of slight modifications to grips, the only real variable is four-seam versus two-seam. In a single pitch design session, it is unlikely that a pitcher will be able to see a wide variance of results with his fastball. At the end of the day, the pitcher’s goal with their fastball should be to throw it as hard as they can. 

    However, with sliders, changeups, and curveballs, there is a ton of potential variance. Through grip, release, and cue modifications, a pitcher has a ton of ways to craft a breaking ball to fit their fastball’s needs. If a pitcher’s slider drops too much to create an effective tunnel, instruct them to throw it harder. If a pitcher’s slider doesn’t drop enough, instruct them to impart more topspin on the ball. There isn’t a hard-and-fast answer to every problem, but there is almost always room for exploration with secondary offerings. 

    Next time you look at a pitcher’s pitch data, fight the urge to automatically assume that more movement is better. In the majority of cases, it is not. Instead, ask yourself why the pitcher with 30 inches of horizontal break differential between their sinker and slider fail to generate chases or whiffs. There is almost always a reason, and that reason is almost always related to excess movement. 

    One would be shocked at how many Major League pitchers fail to generate chases due to the poor tunnels their pitches form. Even pitchers who pitch for analytically progressive organizations. Cristian Javier of the Houston Astros is putting together a really solid season, but his one shortcoming is his chase rate. Operating as a two-pitch pitcher, it is crucial to maximize the effectiveness of his fastball-slider combination. 28 inches of vertical drop differential and 22 inches of horizontal separation do not cut it. His chase rate is well below average, which triggers a poor walk rate. The domino effect is real.  

    I opened the article with a critique mathematical stuff models, so let me elaborate. I am unsure of the composition of every model out there, but I have noticed a common trend. Stuff+ models factor in movement differentials between pitches, but they do so in a linear fashion. They neglect the fact that ideal movement differentials often exist on a spectrum. Similar to a variable such as launch angle, too much and too little are both detrimental. As we’ve covered throughout this piece, there usually exists a sweet-spot that catalyzes ideal tunnels. Stuff+ models should incorporate these sweet-spots, as to not overvalue pitchers who generate too much movement. 

    We often see pitchers overperform or underperform stuff models, and our gut reaction is to attribute the gap to command. Pitcher X has a 2.00 ERA and 50-grade stuff? He must have elite command! While that may occasionally be the case, I believe that the majority of these cases can be attributed to effective or ineffective tunneling. 

    We’ve already discussed Jordan Hicks in length as a guy whose stuff is better on paper than in practice, but let’s look at an opposite example. Tony Gonsolin is putting together quite the season for the Dodgers. His stuff is respectable on the surface, but I doubt anyone is writing home about it. Many models grade Gonsolin’s stuff as below average. 

    However, Gonsolin’s arsenal is far from below average. He generates 16 inches of drop differential and 12 inches of horizontal separation between his fastball and slider. Both figures fall in the ideal sweet-spot. His fastball and splitter are separated by 23 inches of drop and 4 inches of run, which is remarkable. He also sports a curveball that operates as one of the best called strike pitches in Major League Baseball. See how the conventional approach to stuff evaluation does a disservice to Gonsolin? 

    To recap, here are the 10 conclusions I hope you draw from this piece: 

    1. More movement is not always beneficial. 
    1. To form an ideal tunnel, fastballs and breaking balls should be separated by 16-26 inches of vertical drop. 20 is the number to strive for. 
    1. Any breaking ball with more than 30 inches of vertical separation from its corresponding fastball should be used more as a called strike pitch than a chase pitch. 
    1. As a general principle, more vertical separation between fastballs and off-speeds is beneficial. There may be a point where vertical separation becomes counterproductive, but pitchers have not approached that extreme level yet. 
    1. 14 seems to be the essential benchmark of vertical separation between fastballs and changeups. 
    1. A breaking ball with more than 17 inches of horizontal separation from their corresponding fastball rarely succeed as whiff generators, since they fail to induce enough swings. 
    1. Ideally, a breaking ball should possess between 6-16 inches of horizontal break differential from its corresponding fastball. 
    1. Fastball-changeup horizontal separation is not as important as vertical separation, but it is still beneficial to create separation on multiple planes.
    1. Splitters are lethal weapons. 
    1. As a general principle, vertical drop separation is more indicative of whiff generation than horizontal separation, due to the anatomy of the bat. 

    There will always be exceptions to these rules, so do not automatically dismiss an effective tunnel if it breaches one of the ten conclusions listed above. These should simply be guidelines for pitcher evaluation and, more importantly, pitcher development. 

    I hope you learned something from my research. I certainly learned a ton while conducting this analysis. Thankfully, we are only scratching the surface of our understanding of ball-flight tracking data. 

    I would like to give a quick shoutout to a piece written by writers at prospectslive.com on pitch tunneling. Their analysis helped assist my understanding of this woefully-misunderstood science. If you are curious to learn more about this fascinating topic, I highly recommend checking it out.

    August 29, 2022
    MLB Baseball
    jordan hicks, pitch design, tunneling
  • Believe the Breakout? (Pitcher Edition)

    Believe the Breakout? (Pitcher Edition)

    Primer: I started working on this prior to the All-Star break, so this post is long overdue. I still firmly believe in these breakouts and their abilities in the future, regardless of any mid-summer struggles. With that being said, I now present Believe Breakout: Pitcher Edition. This mini series will feature three pitchers and three hitters who have broken out in 2022. I will analyze what has lead to the breakout thus far and why I believe their performance is sustainable moving forward. Here we go.

     

    Shane McClanahan

    Shane McClanahan is the first pitcher headlining this crop of breakouts. The former first-round pick looked very strong in his pro debut last season. In my opinion, McClanahan has firmly solidified himself as one of the top pitchers in all of baseball. On the surface, his stat line is on pace for Cy Young level recognition: 11-5, 2.28 ERA, 134.1 IP, 165 K, 26 BB. Digging deeper into McClanahan overall, his profile looks even better.

    https://twitter.com/MLBNetworkRadio/status/1542165902405386242?s=20&t=aBqxMF7zX-PIiOXBfmvaaA

    Among all qualified starting pitchers, he still ranks in the top 5 in FIP (2.64), xFIP (2.29), SIERA (2.52), K% (32.2), wOBA (.236), xwOBA (.250), xBA (.201), xOBP (.246), Hard Hit % (30.2), Whiff% (35.6), SwStr% (16.6), and CSW% (34.4). Just to name a few. McClanahan has quite a unique profile for such a power arm. He has an innate ability to miss bats as shown through the elite Whiff% and SwStr%. What separates McClanahan from the rest is that he couples this bat missing stuff with impressive command and the ability to induce large quantities of weak contact on the ground. He has the highest GB% among starting pitchers with at least a 24.4 K%. Only three of these pitchers are above 47.0 GB% while McClanahan sits atop at 50.9%. Despite generating ground balls on 50% of his batted balls allowed, his 83.4 MPH Avg Exit Velo on GBs is the ninth lowest among pitchers with at least 250 BBE. Simply put, McClanahan induces ground balls at a high quantity at extremely low exit velocities. The consistent ability to generate whiffs and cause hitters to produce suboptimal launch angles is a rare pairing for a starting pitcher. All of this on top of the fact that he is in the 89th percentile in BB% and ranks in the 83rd and 80th percentiles in various command models. McClanahan has been utterly dominant so far and has the makings to continue on this path for years to come.

    Is this level of production sustainable? Short answer, yes. I strongly believe this is the case due to his mixture of elite stuff, improved pitch shapes, improved command, and better optimized pitch usage.

    An overview of Shane McClanahan’s pitch arsenal: via the Pitch Leaderboard

      MPH RPM Active % Measured Inferred Spin Diff Ext (ft.) V-Rel pt. H-Rel pt. VB HB VAA HAA
    Fastball 96.7 2,223 99.1 10:43 10:52 4.8° 6.8 6.3 0.7 17.6 10.7 -5.1° -0.3°
    Curveball 81.5 2,642 57.3 4:28 4:54 13.1° 6.8 6.1 0.9 -11.9 -8.2 -9.6° 1.9°
    Changeup 87.6 1,725 98.1 9:49 9:48 0.8° 6.8 6.1 1.0 10.2 15.9 -7.1° -1.1°
    Slider 88.8 2,357 22.6 12:55 2:35 49.6° 6.8 6.1 1.0 2.7 -3.9 -7.6° 1.9°

    Here’s how this arsenal grades out (20-80 scale) according to PitchingBot.

    The Athletic’s Stuff+ model largely agrees (100 being league average).

    Stuff+ Location+ Pitching+
    118.9 103.9 109.1

     

    He ranks 7th among all SP in the Athletic’s Stuff+ model and is in the 91st percentile of all pitchers. Same story with the PitchingBot’s Stuff grade as he ranks in 97th percentile of all pitchers and is one of only nine SP with a Stuff grade of at least 65. The PitchingBot gives McClanahan an overall grade of 65 which ranks 21st out of 706 total entries. His Command grade ranks much lower relative to other SP, but it is still strong considering how prolific his stuff is.

    McClanahan’s stuff was already good in 2021. There are few slight distinctions that have allowed him to take off this year.

    His fastball has always stood out due to velocity. While the velocity has remained constant in the pros, the pitch’s movement profile has shifted ever so slightly. He was able to increase the spin efficiency from 96.8% to 99.1%, thus leading to a greater maximization of vertical movement on the pitch (16.3 -> 17.6). It’s hard to know exactly what led to this increase, but it is likely some combination of grip, finger pressure, and wrist orientation.

    At its current state, McClanahan’s fastball is a relatively unique pitch from a left-handed perspective. Since the beginning of 2021, only five other left-handed pitchers have been able to achieve greater than 99.0% spin efficiency on their fastball while maintaining a 10:42 spin axis or lower. His teammate, Jeffery Springs, is the most similar in terms of movement (18.1 VB, 10.3 HB), but McClanahan throws more than 5 MPH harder on average. The combination of above-average vertical movement, elite velocity, and the unique pairing of horizontal movement all from a 3/4 arm slot provides the makings for a truly unique pitch for a starting pitcher.

    This subtle improvement in VB is significant for multiple reasons. The first of which being that the improved vertical break is important for inducing whiffs and missing barrels, particularly up in the zone. There is also greater room for error in the zone that his velo no longer could provide by itself.

    In addition, this adjustment is especially important because it coincides with the improvement and success of his changeup. While he added around an extra inch of VB on his fastball, McClanahan was also able to kill an inch of lift on his changeup. He’s used a new “Split-Change” grip which has been effective in doing so.

    https://twitter.com/PitchingNinja/status/1541118157787729921?s=20&t=RbpbqS3WwvkK61wzQ9gi_Q
    https://twitter.com/LanceBroz/status/1518288690409320451?s=20&t=RbpbqS3WwvkK61wzQ9gi_Q

    He was able to kill an inch of lift (11.1 -> 10.2 VB) while maintaining similar run (15.6 -> 15.9). In this adjustment, McClanahan did sacrifice 1.6 MPH (89.2 -> 87.6). However, he was able to increase the velo differential to his fastball and improve the shape of the pitch, leading to a substantial increase in stuff quality on the changeup.

     

      Velo Difference Spin Difference VB Difference Long VB Difference HB Difference 
    2021 5.2 531 5.2 10.1 5.1
    2022 9.2 499 7.4 13.8 5.2
    Changeup w context (to Fastball)

     

    The difference in vertical movement from the fastball has been shown to be a key indicator of changeup success. The Drivelines and Treads of the world have done numerous studies showing that vertical break separation to the fastball had the greatest significance to increased GB% and Whiff%.

    McClanahan was able to widen this vertical movement gap with both the fastball and changeup adjustments (5.2 in -> 7.4 in). The increase in fastball backspin allows for better success with the pitch on its own but also contributes to the success of the changeup.

    The curveball was already elite. The slider was hard and well-above average. Adding on the improvements the fastball and changeup provides for one of the most well-rounded arsenals in the game today.

     

    https://twitter.com/PitchingNinja/status/1543284990028517376?s=20&t=RbpbqS3WwvkK61wzQ9gi_Q

    To add to an embarrassment of riches, McClanahan has improved his command along the way and improved the sequencing of his pitches. He effectively locates fastballs up in the zone and changeups down and away, all with the curveball and hard slider tunneling off of both pitches. His walk rates are near the top of the league. He has above-average total command grades, which is more impressive given how good his stuff is. He now has much better optimization of his pitch usage.

      Fastball % Curveball % Changeup % Slider %
    2021 40.9 16.3 8.0 34.7
    2022 34.5 24.7 25.5 15.4

    He’s throwing his best pitches more and is commanding them well. This makes the fastball even more effective, especially when he has 97 in his back pocket with good ride and run. All in all, Shane McClanahan has turned himself into one of the premier starting pitchers in the game today. His improvements to already elite stuff, improving command, and better-optimized pitch usage provide him with the basis to maintain his current trajectory.


    Clay Holmes

    Clay Holmes was acquired by the Yankees at the 2021 Trade Deadline and has been one of the best relievers in baseball ever since. His initial breakout took place between the months of August and October of 2021. He was very good last year after being traded and drove himself into the upper echelon of relievers. This year, Holmes has been next level good at times. He went from a near 5.00 ERA and rocking over 5 BB/9 in Pittsburgh to now stepping into New York’s closer role and allowing only 2 earned runs through his first 37 innings pitched in 2022. One of these earned runs came in his first outing of the year. He went 31 innings before allowing another earned run.

    *Note: Since I started writing this, he has had two recent outings where he’s given up 3 ER (all on a HR) and 4 ER. These have both really inflated his counting stats (FIP, xFIP). Nonetheless, Holmes has allowed an earned run in only 6 of his 48 total appearances (the same as Edwin Diaz who’s appeared in 47 games).

    Despite the two hiccup appearances, Holmes is STILL one of six qualified relievers to have an ERA, xERA, FIP, xFIP, and SIERA all below 2.60. He is in the 99th percentile in xwOBA, xwOBACON, and Barrel%. Holmes leads all relievers in GB% (82.5) by a large margin. His average launch angle is -10.4, the lowest by nearly 7 degrees. His strikeout numbers don’t stand out but he’s been the best reliever in baseball in terms of producing suboptimal batted ball outcomes. Holmes has allowed eleven fly balls in 49 innings. He’s allowed five fly balls since May 26. Four flyouts and a home run. These are absurd numbers, especially for a reliever who is used as frequently and in high leverage situations.

    Is it sustainable? Before answering this question, I’ll analyze how Clay Holmes reinvented his pitch arsenal.

    Holmes always had a pretty good sinker and backed it up with a hard slider. Last year, his sinker velo ranked in the 84th percentile (96.1 MPH) and the horizontal movement (15.3 in) ranked in the 50th percentile. Both of those numbers have improved this year: 92nd percentile velo (96.9 MPH) and 80th percentile HB (16.8 in). The pitch comes in from a very steep VAA which plays into his ability to induce ground balls at a high rate. In fact, it’s in the 96th percentile in terms of steepness among all sinkers. It’s the hardest pitch thrown in this upper echelon of steep sinkers. Only one other sinker has more run while thrown at a steeper VAA. The pitch is a bit of an outlier in that sense.

    The improvement to his already unique sinker has contributed greatly to his success. However, the emergence of his slider has taken Holmes to the next level.

    Last year, he threw the pitch at 87.7 MPH and it was more of a bullet slider with some drop. This offseason he developed a sweeping slider which many other Yankees have begun adding to their own repertoires. Some call it a sweeper. Others call it whirly. Regardless, it has revolutionized the landscape of pitching and pitch design. There’s a lot of good articles and videos that go more in-depth on the sweeper and seam-shifted wake.

    Holmes fully bought into the sweeper phenomenon and has added nearly 10 inches of sweep while maintaining the same amount of drop and only sacrificing 2 MPH of velocity. Only seven others since 2021 have been able to throw a sweeper with at least 12 inches of HB at 85 MPH or harder. His new pitch has a 25.4 SwStr% which is in the 93rd percentile of all sliders.

    https://twitter.com/LanceBroz/status/1524821176039636992?s=20&t=RbpbqS3WwvkK61wzQ9gi_Q

    Holmes created a dominant one-two punch which has led him to become one of the better relievers in baseball. Now there is nearly 30 inches of horizontal separation between his sinker and slider.

    The PitchingBot loved Holmes prior to the All-Star break. The Athletic’s Stuff+ model still has him graded as one of the best in all of baseball.

    Stuff+ Location+ Pitching+
    137.6 (99th percentile) 95.1 103.9

    The sinker has been nearly unhittable. He throws it more than 80% of the time and it’s still dominant. Adding a firm sweeper to complement it is scary for opposing hitters.

    The low Command grade would be the only area of concern. However, Holmes is able to get away with it because of how good his stuff is. Edwin Diaz and Josh Hader both have 50 command grades and have still been dominant relievers. As long as he’s in the zone, his stuff will take care of the rest. I believe the newly built arsenal and maintenance of average command should allow Holmes to maintain as one of the better relievers in the MLB.


    Kyle Wright

    Kyle Wright may not be the first name that comes to mind in terms of 2022 breakouts. However, his stuff, command, and overall performance improvements deserve recognition. According to the Pitching Bot, he is the leader in both the greatest Stuff and Command differences between this year and last. He’s been a top 35 SP in terms of FIP, xFIP, SIERA, and fWAR. Assuming on average every team has roughly 5-6 starting pitchers per staff, that’s at least 150 starting pitchers in the league at a given time. Having a starter fall anywhere in the top 35 of that sample is extremely valuable. He’s gone at least 6 innings while allowing 3 runs or less in 15 of his 22 starts so far. He’s had 3 really tough outings, but otherwise has been very consistent and reliable for a quality start. Wright’s been nowhere near Cy Young level good, but he’s turned himself into a very high-end, middle of the rotation type of arm on a deep pitching staff for a contending team.

    He grades out pretty well according to The Athletic and Pitching Bot.

    Stuff+ Location+ Pitching+
    111.2 100.9 102

    The ascendance of Wright’s curveball has been a difference maker. His curveball is now one of the elites among SP. In 2022, the pitch ranks in the 92nd percentile in CSW% and the 85th percentile for SwStr% when compared to other starters. The depth and sweep had always been strong, but he’s added nearly 4 MPH to the pitch since his debut in 2019.

    Only 2 other curveballs in baseball meet his same thresholds:

    MPH ≥ 84.4, Drop ≥ 9 inches, Sweep ≥ 10 inches

    This is all coming from a lower release height (5.6 on average). It’s a truly unique pitch. The rest of his arsenal tunnels really well off the pitch too (particularly the FB which helps make up for it’s shape). The fastball falls in the dead zone with regards to movement (12.7, -11.6) but has been thrown up to 97 with a very flat approach angle (-4.2). The sinker and changeup combo is also strong. His sinker has similar velo to the 4 seam and features good horizontal movement (16.8 in). The changeup has tremendous VB separation from the fastball (12.1 in) to go along with 16 inches of run. His slider doesn’t grade out particularly well metrically but also isn’t thrown very often (only 6% of the time).

    I tried to line the two pitches up at about the same distance from the plate. I think this does a good job illustrating the strong tunnels that Wright creates with his arsenal. The first pitch is an 84 MPH curveball that breaks to the opposite side of the plate. The second is a 92 MPH sinker in on the hands.

     

    He’s another. The sequence goes CB, CH, FB. All starting on the outside corner from roughly the same spot. One day I’ll learn how to create a Pitching Ninja overlay. For now, the semi-accurate screenshots will have to do.

    https://twitter.com/PitchingNinja/status/1550995911706378241?s=20&t=yQP2eEc2jclSvLG4Zc3WEA

    Wright’s arsenal is pretty strong in terms of depth and stuff profiles. He does a good job of maximizing the cohesiveness of this arsenal through strong tunnels. The fastball is thrown primarily to lefties but has a tendency to get hit around a bit. That seems to be a main area of concern with the profile.

    By no means do I expect Kyle Wright to ascend to ace status. He doesn’t need to anchor a pitching staff. The Braves already have a very deep starting group (Fried, Strider, Morton, Odorizzi, w Soroka coming back, and Anderson regaining his footing in AAA). However, Wright is a very strong complimentary piece to a rotation. Wright has a deep arsenal that features three plus pitches to go along with a low launch 4 seam up to 97 with a flat VAA. Improvements to the 4 seam shape would take Wright to that next level, but it doesn’t seem likely due to the present feel for supination. It also isn’t particularly necessary as the velo and flat shape could help it play up. All in all, Kyle Wright has a strong base to provide for sustained success moving forward.

     

    Honorable Mentions: (Other breakouts who I believe are sustainable)

    • Spencer Strider
    • Dylan Cease
    • Ryan Helsley

    Stay tuned for the hitter edition.

    August 16, 2022
    MLB Baseball
    Pitching
  • BCTeam Update: Pitch Outcomes Tab

    BCTeam Update: Pitch Outcomes Tab

    Today we launched one of the best BCTeam updates to date. This new pitcher profile tab, Pitch Outcomes, combines features previously found in the Pitch Arsenal and Plate Discipline sections. We realized that so much of the information from these two pages overlap with and relate to each other that we needed to combine them into one page. Thus, Pitch Outcomes was born. 

    BCTeam, Pitch arenal, plate disclipline, Yakkertech
    BCTeam, Pitch arenal, plate disclipline, Yakkertech

    This page focuses on how a pitcher uses his arsenal against righty and lefty hitters, in different counts, and in different situations; and breaks down the effectiveness of each scenario. This new page also allows the user to not have to filter as much by providing splits and count information side-by-side.

    BCTeam, Pitch arenal, plate disclipline, Yakkertech
    BCTeam, Pitch arenal, plate disclipline, Yakkertech

    The trend chart allows coaches and players to track different metrics like velocity, break, and spin efficiency over the course of the season and analyze characteristics on a pitch-by-pitch basis. This way pitchers will be able to see if the axis on their Slider has changed over the past month or if their velocity has trended down recently due to fatigue. 

    BCTeam, Pitch arenal, plate disclipline, Yakkertech

    Plate Discipline tables are prevalent on this page as well that provide insights on strike rates, whiff rates, and contact rates. These tables also break down pitch location for in zone, edge (ball in, ball out), inside, high, and low in relation to the team average and D1 average.

    BCTeam, Pitch arenal, plate disclipline, Yakkertech
    BCTeam, Pitch arenal, plate disclipline, Yakkertech

    Strike Zones that isolate each pitch type are found on the Pitch Outcomes page making it easier to evaluate pitch performance and location for swings, balls in play, and contact type. 

    BCTeam, Pitch arenal, plate disclipline, Yakkertech, strike zones

    As summer comes to a close, we are gearing up for fall baseball to provide our coaches and players with the most useful platform to make player development more efficient and scouting more effective. 

    August 1, 2022
    BCTips
  • An Analysis of Jakob Junis, Arsenal Distribution, and Pitcher Individuality

    An Analysis of Jakob Junis, Arsenal Distribution, and Pitcher Individuality

    The outlook for Jakob Junis was bleak, to say the least. After opening his 2021 campaign with four solid starts, Kansas City Royals Manager Mike Matheny sat the right-handed pitcher down in his office and informed him of the team’s plan to move him to the bullpen. Jakob Junis, who sported a 3.47 ERA through 23.1 innings at the time, was rightfully surprised, as a demotion from the starting rotation to the pen often comes after a string of poor outings. Nonetheless, this managerial decision would foreshadow the rocky road ahead in the relationship between Junis and the Royals. 

    Matters took a turn for the worst after Junis allowed 9 earned runs in his first 6 innings out of the pen. On June 6th, the Royals optioned Junis to their Triple-A affiliate. He proceeded to throw 4.2 more innings for the big-league club before happily electing to proceed as a free agent. The decision was a rather easy one for the 29-year-old pitcher, as he publicly stated, “To say things ended well over there would be a lie.” 

    Junis’ tenure with the Royals organization had spanned over decade, having signed out of high school in 2011. Despite a remarkable high school career, Junis’ fastball was never his strong suit. According to scouting reports, Junis’ fastball sat in the high 80s, low 90s range—enough to dominate the high school baseball circuit, but a few ticks below the Major League standard.  

    What was his strong suit? His slider. Junis’ slider is and has always been his most productive pitch, and it wasn’t remotely close. To put it into perspective, in his time with Kansas City, Junis’ slider recorded a run value of –25. That was his only pitch with a cumulative negative run value across his five seasons with the Royals. Even in Jakob Junis’ turbulent 2021 season, his slider generated a remarkable 40.2% whiff rate. It wasn’t only his best pitch; it was one of the better pitches in the league.  

    Jakob Junis

    Characteristically speaking, the pitch falls into the “sweeper” category of sliders, generating approximately 12 inches of sweep. As is the case with most sweepers, Junis’ slider approached the plate at a rather steep horizontal angle that often approached 4.00° (nearly one degree steeper than the league average slider). A general principle for breaking balls is that velocity and spin-induced movement come at a trade-off. The hardest-thrown breaking balls possess a ton of gyro spin and induce little spin-based movement. The slower breaking balls are often the loopy curveballs with south of –10 inches of induced drop. Junis’ slider drastically evolved over time. From 2020 to 2021, Junis sacrificed 4 inches of sweep for nearly 3 MPH. As a result, his whiff rate and chase rate both rose dramatically. 

    If Jakob Junis possessed such a dominant pitch, why couldn’t he sustain success at the MLB level? Well, the Royals development system evidently fell victim to old school baseball philosophies that preach the importance of establishing one’s fastball. For the flame-throwers who pump triple digits with above-average lift, this motto may hold true. However, Junis did not fit that mold. Not only was his velocity comfortably below average, but his fastball shape was ineffective as well. To put it bluntly, his fastball was a bad pitch. And that bad pitch consumed over a third of his pitch distribution.  

    MLB hitters destroy fastballs. In 2022, the league average wOBA against fastballs is .340, compared to .276 against offspeed and .270 against breaking balls. MLB hitters are like sharks. The same way sharks can smell blood from a distance, MLB hitters can smell a bad fastball from a mile away. They took this to the extreme against Junis. Earlier, I stated that Junis’ slider recorded a run value of –25 in his five seasons with the Royals. Across that same time span, his fastball posted a run value of 23, and a .407 wOBA against. Not only was it a bad pitch; it was a bad pitch that hitters hammered.  

    In Junis’ defense, I wholeheartedly believe that this was not his fault. He is not cut out to throw a four-seam fastball. A strong indication that a pitcher is not cut out for a traditional four-seamer is if their four-seam spin efficiency falls in the 70%-90% range. Some of the sport’s most dominant pitchers fall into this mold, such as Max Fried, Noah Syndergaard, and Tanner Houck. From a mechanical standpoint, this usually means that the pitcher struggles to stay behind the ball. We often refer to these pitchers as natural supinators. 

    Although a natural supinator may struggle to generate backspin on the baseball, they often succeed by maximizing the east-to-west movement profiles of their pitches. Junis is no different. He rarely threw his sinker during his time with the Royals, but in the small sample we have, we can see that he generated approximately 15 inches of run on the pitch. This allowed him to get nearly 30 inches of horizontal movement differential between his sinker and his slider. Kansas City’s issue was not the development of the sinker; Junis had the pitch in his arsenal. They merely failed to recognize that embracing his supination-based throwing style was the key to his success. 

    This is the part of the story where the protagonist enters the picture. In Junis’ story, the protagonist was the San Francisco Giants. Jakob Junis signed a one-year, $1.5 million contract with the Giants this past offseason. For the Giants, this was a low-cost upside play on a pitcher for whom they strove to develop. For Junis, this was a chance to play Major League Baseball and work with one of the most analytically-driven franchises with a proven track record of exceptional pitcher development. 

    Analytics is a complicated field. The public’s perception of analytics is likely fueled by Peter Brand’s role in Moneyball as a Yale quant whose mathematical approach to the sport helped lead the 2002 Oakland Athletics to 103 wins. The brutal reality is that analytics can get a lot more complicated than that. Nowadays, professional teams employ ever-expanding data science departments that focus on predictive modeling with player tracking data to fuel player evaluation and player development. However, Junis’ rise from fringe big leaguer to productive front-of-the-rotation pitcher can be summarized by a piece of advice that may appear obvious to most. 

    “Throw your best pitches more” 

    You may be thinking “well… duh!” And I don’t blame you! It sounds like a rudimentary recommendation that should not even need to be said. Yet it does. Until baseball rids itself of the old-school mindsets that plague pitching, this simple piece of advice can serve as a competitive advantage for the more open-minded organizations, such as the San Francisco Giants. 

    The Giants completely reshaped Junis’ pitch distribution. In 2021, he threw his slider 40% of the time, his fastball 35% of the time, his cutter 17% of the time, his sinker 4% of the time, and his changeup 3% of the time. Approximately halfway into his 2022 campaign with the Giants, distribution now sits at 53% slider, 32% sinker, 14% changeup, and 1% cutter. Through 709 pitches, Statcast has only tracked 5 four-seam fastballs from Junis.  

    As you could have probably predicted, Junis’ optimized arsenal has led to massive boosts in production. At the 2022 All-Star Break, Junis has thrown 50 innings, while posting a 2.98 ERA, 1.01 WHIP, and 3.73 xFIP. Even though his swing-and-miss numbers have not changed much, the demise of his four-seamer has completely augmented his ability to limit hard contact. Junis has posted a considerable drop in Barrel%, HardHit%, wOBACON, and SweetSpot%. It has been a breakout season for Junis, and the Giants have been handsomely rewarded for their low-risk gamble on the 29-year-old righty who found himself in Triple-A a year ago. 

    As hard as it may be to believe, this article isn’t really about Junis. Junis is merely a microcosm of a greater issue in baseball. Pitchers at all levels are constantly held back due to old-fashioned philosophies. Not everyone is cut out for a four-seamer. Not everyone needs to be a fastball-primary pitcher. It is perfectly fine to throw a slider over 50% of the time if it is far and away your best pitch. Just because there is a status quo on how to pitch does not mean one must follow that status quo. 

    I would be lying if I said that these shortcomings in baseball philosophy aren’t diminishing. Fastball usage is decreasing every year in Major League Baseball and more-and-more pitchers are utilizing their best pitches as their primaries. Pitchers who struggle to generate backspin on the baseball are often shaping their arsenals around pitches that don’t require backspin, such as sinkers, sliders, and changeups. Regardless of the strides that the game has taken, Junis’ story demonstrates that there are still plenty of organizations that hold their pitchers back from maximizing their effectiveness. 

    I am optimistic about the trends that we’ve seen in the tracking data era of baseball. Data is knowledge and knowledge is power. Well, let me rephrase. Knowledge is only power if it comes with the willingness to deviate from traditional viewpoints. Knowledge can only get a guy so far if they lack the willingness to utilize that knowledge.  

    We do not know definitively if the Royals detected issues with Junis’ four-seamer, but it would be hard not to. After all, that pitch was as unproductive as his slider was productive. However, we do know that they failed to even scrape the surface of Junis’ potential due to their commitment to the heater that should have never existed in the first place. This isn’t a matter of placing Junis into a biomechanical laboratory to garner advanced reports on his mechanical composition. This is simply a matter of throwing your best pitches more—a piece of advice that seems so obvious yet evades the conventional wisdom that plagues pitching development. 

    July 27, 2022
    MLB Baseball
  • BCTeam Update: Batted Ball Tab

    Today, an update was pushed to the Batted Ball tab of hitter and pitcher profiles on BCTeam that provides a revamped way of analyzing a batted ball profile. This update includes added summary tables, additional visual options, and even a brand new tool.

    Baseball Cloud, Yakkertech, Batted Ball

    When landing on the page it initially looks similar, but as you scroll down you will notice an updated Batted Ball summary table with new metrics like Hard Hit LA (average launch of “Hard Hit” balls) and GB/FB ratio. 

    Baseball Cloud, Yakkertech, Batted Ball

    Farther down the page there are plenty of new visuals including Play Result, Exit Velocity, and Contact Type spray charts; as well as, Heat Maps with 13 dropdown options with metrics like Swing %, Hard Hit %, and Damage %. 

    Baseball Cloud, Yakkertech, Batted Ball

    To limit clicking and allow coaches and players more time to analyze performance we combined some aspects from the Point of Contact tab of hitter profiles into this new Batted Ball tab. The Point of Contact strike zone visuals provides great context of where a hitter is making contact in relation to home plate and where he is doing most of his damage or getting beat by certain pitches.

    Baseball Cloud, Yakkertech, Batted Ball

    The final chart at the bottom is a new feature that helps contextualize batted balls effectively by bucketing outcomes like Exit Velocity, Launch Angle, and Launch Direction. This allows coaches and players to see the direction and exit angle that they hit the majority of their hard-hit balls.

    Throughout the rest of the summer and into the fall we have huge plans for our entire product suite, including launching new products so that we can continue to offer the best player development, scouting, and video tools. 

    July 19, 2022
    BCTips
  • Analytical Scouting – Finding the Balance

    Everyone is aware of the rise of analytics across all industries, whether healthcare, business, education, or sports. The application of analytics has drastically affected evaluation and decision-making processes within organizations and individuals, leading to innovative growth and achievement.

    Predictive analytics has allowed for higher success in asset acquisition and completely changed decision-making science. However, as the science and construction of analytics have evolved with new models and statistical development, the application of analytics has somewhat become oversaturated in nature.

    Models and analytical evaluations can act as better decision-makers than humans, but humans dictate the inputs and data development. If we become overly reliant on analytics without considering what decisions they are making and the criteria they’re using, we lose focus of the intended goal.

    I want to touch on how analytics has dramatically changed the landscape of sports, specifically baseball. 

    Baseball Analytics

    For the betterment of baseball, analytics has created a whole new world within the sport. It is hard to remember when advanced baseball analytics didn’t have a home in the game. Baseball analytics has transformed the game’s player evaluation and development aspects, creating new ways to measure and quantify talent. This is shown by developing statistics such as WAR, WRC, wOBA, etc. We can micro-analyze nearly all aspects of the game but sometimes lose our direction in analyzing the data independent of the presented context. 

    The evolution of a baseball evaluator and analyst has come a long way as teams are now hiring and seeking talent that can apply data and technical skills to the context of baseball. The issue at hand for all evaluators and teams is creating the correct blend of analytics and scouting. To act skewed to either side is naive in nature and contributes to a flawed evaluation process.

    Over my time as an amateur baseball evaluator, I have learned methods to enhance my player evaluation by applying aspects of baseball analytics to scouting itself. In its raw nature, analytics can help quantify or describe something that the human eye can’t. Common examples include pitch and batted ball metrics.

    Scouting vernacular can be tied to events and characteristics described by metrics, creating a cohesive blend backed up by both sides. This shows how baseball analytics and scouting can be bounced off one another to support claims in player evaluation. I want to question the context of analytics within a player evaluation. 

    Baseball has come to a general understanding of quantifying good and bad with analytical interpretations, which is an essential step in the process. The next step is contextualizing the analytical evaluations through a scouting eye.

    After understanding what’s good and bad, we have shifted to weighting statistics on different levels. Essentially, certain aspects matter more than others, when evaluating. Within these aspects, teams construct their player development departments to refine what can be refined. Research and PD have shown it’s likelier that a hitter can improve their swing decisions and process rather than their bat-to-ball skills.

    While on the flipside for pitchers, pitch design is inherently known as a loud and present science. Teams feel more confident developing pitchers with good base traits who have room to go with their “stuff.” In essence, player development can help make players more dynamic instead of skilled. Thus, it is up to teams to develop their organizational scouting and evaluation philosophy to funnel to their PD pipeline. 

    Tradeoffs are also essential to evaluate within baseball analytics. At what threshold do you deem a hitter’s batted ball data acceptable, at the expense of high whiff rates? How much is too much? These questions are asked within departments and evaluators not to get blinded by the story the numbers tell.

    Scouts are necessary to validate possible data suggestions as they consider a player’s movements, body, age, and intangibles. As in the case of pitchers, if I run a stuff model and a player grades out highly, but said player had had poor reports on his body and mechanics, all while failing to throw pitches over the plate, is he worth the investment? The threshold for leaning into the stuff model at the expense of all other traits is suspect. The next market of scouting and evaluation within teams is leaning into their PD departments to learn what’s attainable to help a player refine his skillset and application. 

    I wanted to write about this topic because, at times, I feel the data is blinding evaluators and shouldn’t be used as a lead all resource, while it should be relied on heavily.

    Skewing data to fit one’s narrative of a player also presents a naive evaluation process. I’m excited to see how analytics continue to transcend baseball and player evaluation itself.

    Human inputs and what we deem important, good and bad, will continue to evolve when evaluating talent. The most crucial part is continuing to refine the process, while keeping an open mind to anything.

    Remember that data is objective, but the context we choose to interpret and apply it is subjective

    . 

    July 5, 2022
    MLB Baseball
  • Press Release: BaseballCloud Acquires Super Camera Provider, Aqueti

    Press Release: BaseballCloud Acquires Super Camera Provider, Aqueti

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

    June 29, 2022

    LONGWOOD, Florida – Data analytics and visualization company, BaseballCloud, has acquired multi-array camera imaging system and video platform company, Aqueti Inc. Aqueti was founded by Professor David Brady and Duke University in 2013, and is best known for their patented lens and micro camera modules and proprietary data compression software. The acquisition is the latest of many for BaseballCloud, as they continue to create a universal platform for interactive data, video, and multimedia. Last year, the company acquired Yakkertech Ltd., the largest optical tracking system provider in amateur sports.

    With the acquisition, BaseballCloud will incorporate Aqueti’s technology into Yakkertech’s system to enhance data quality, incorporate video, and streamline new media initiatives within the industry. BaseballCloud plans to roll out a new multi-array Yakkertech system, alongside Aqueti’s technology, that will leverage advancements in optical engineering to help ensure data quality, visual acuity, and reduce system costs.

    Sean Cashman, President of Yakkertech, highlights what this means for the industry, “Over the last year we have worked extensively with Dave and his team, what his technology can do is going to change the entire data landscape for the broader market.”

    Aqueti, led by David Brady, is the leader in array super cameras. Aqueti cameras form images by digitally combining data from an array of micro-cameras. These images become interactive digital streams that their technology allows multiple users to manipulate. Users can control the spatial resolution, field-of-view, and time window to meet their application needs. Aqueti’s premier Mantis camera, a 19-lens camera with processors that combine images into a 100-megapixel frame, allows users to zoom in to reveal extraordinary detail. 

    David Brady led the joint Duke University and University of Arizona team that built the world’s first gigapixel camera in 2012. He will be joining the BaseballCloud team, effectively immediately as the CTO. Looking to expand his technology into BaseballCloud’s multimedia platform. Brady notes that “BaseballCloud delivers revolutionary media combining data and visualization. Integrating this platform with YakkerTech’s world-leading data analytics and Aqueti’s gigapixel camera technology will bring physical sports into the metaverse and enable true social media.”

    BaseballCloud will also be looking to expand their technology platform beyond sports. Aqueti cameras are used for wide area highway, railway, campus and city security with partners in public safety and security across the globe.

    According to Brady, “While networking, computing and storage have improved by orders of magnitude over the past quarter century, folks waiting for clips to download know that video is not much better than it was when “I love Lucy” was broadcast. Content delivery, multimedia visualization and data management from BaseballCloud, AI-forward processing fromYakkerTech and array camera hardware from Aqueti will create unimaginably rich new media.”

    In the age of artificial intelligence and virtual reality, BaseballCloud is committed to expanding participation and enjoyment of physical sports. Through these acquisitions, we will empower millions of players to understand, improve and share their game.

    Kevin Davidson, CEO of BaseballCloud, echoes Brady’s optimism regarding the fusion of the three companies, stating, “We created BaseballCloud to manage the deluge of data from the modern game, but we quickly found that the quality and quantity of data could not meet demand. With the addition of YakkerTech and Aqueti, we have the unique ability to see and understand everything the game has to offer.”

    President of DS Sports Ventures and BaseballCloud Co-Founder, Joe Sleiman, adds, “BaseballCloud empowers the player with information. YakkerTech analytics and Aqueti imagery are part of our unceasing quest to help players, coaches and fans understand themselves, each other and the game. The integration of cloud media, AI-analytics and gigapixel cameras is an example of 1 plus 1 plus 1 equals 111. Our integrated platform will be the first end to end system for intelligent ultra-high resolution media.”

    Read about BaseballCloud’s acquisition of Yakkertech, Ltd. here.

    June 29, 2022
    Press Release
    PR
  • Yordan Alvarez’s Incredible Start to 2022

    As many baseball fans are well aware, there has been a lot of controversy within this 2022 season in regards to the “deadening” of the baseballs being used as well as the distances of the outfield wall in numerous ballparks. This all seems to be going in one ear and out the other for Yordan Alvarez who is demolishing baseballs at an alarming rate. He has performed so well this 2022 season that the Astros decided in the middle of the season to sign him to a six year $115 million deal. The question is, what is contributing to Air-Yordan’s success? What changes has he made from years prior? And where is the individual in the Dodgers front office that let Yordan Alvarez go for Josh Fields?

    Where does Yordan sit comparatively?

    A quick look at Baseball Savant and MLB.com will tell you almost everything you need to know about Yordan’s start to the 2022 season. He has improved dramatically in all major statistical categories in comparison to years prior in his career. The following statistics depict just that:

    • Top 100 percentile of current MLB players in xwOBA, xBA, xSLG and HardHit%
    • Top 99 percentile of current MLB players in Avg Exit Velocity
    • Top 96 percentile of current MLB players in Max Exit Velocity
    • Top 95 percentile of current MLB players in Barrel%
    • Top 91 percentile of current MLB players in BB%
    • Top 86 percentile of current MLB players in Chase Rate
    • Top 82 percentile of current MLB players in K%
    • 3rd in the MLB in AB/HR with an 11.82 average
    • 4th in the MLB with 17 Homeruns
    • 4th in the MLB in OBP % with a .409
    • 4th in the MLB in OPS % with a 1.031
    • 5th in the MLB in ISO% with a .308
    • 6th in the MLB in SLG % with a .622
    • 8th in the MLB in RBI with 43
    • 9th in the MLB in Total Bases with 125
    • 10th in the MLB in BB/K with a .838

    The main question I am sure many of you will have when reading this article is; if you are going to write about a guy hitting for power, why are you writing an article about Yordan Alvarez and not Aaron Judge considering Judge is leading the MLB in HR, SLG, and OPS?

    Well, one reason would admittedly be bias (my Houston ties run deep). However, the main reason would be in the plate discipline between the two power hitting outfielders. Everyone loves a guy that can go deep, but there is something to be said about a guy that can consistently hit the ball hard while also laying off bad pitches and taking the free passes when they come.

    That is the biggest difference between Aaron Judge and Yordan Alvarez. Both mash the baseball at similar rates. Both individuals have an AVG and OBP that varies at max by 4 points. However Judge strikes out a lot more, and walks less in comparison. Statistically, Judge K’s 8.9% more than Yordan and walks 2% less as well (Judge has 64 Strikeouts and 29 walks to Yordan’s 38 Strikeouts and 31 walks). Judge also has a higher Whiff% for each pitch type. Judge’s Whiff% is higher than Yordan’s by 0.6% on fastballs, 5.2% on breaking pitches, and 8.9% on off-speed. All of this leads to Yordan having an On Base Percentage that is 22 points higher than that of Aaron Judge.

    Now all of this shouldn’t take away from the monster start that Aaron Judge is having with the Yankees. Judge has already hit 24 homeruns for the Yankees (given the fact that his home ballpark is 8 feet farther than Yordan’s in terms of pull side distance) and has an OPS of 1.059. However, I do not feel like his plate discipline comes close to the plate discipline of Yordan Alvarez.

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    Where is the Success Coming From?

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    When looking into Yordan’s 2022 season, there are a couple of intriguing things I noticed in comparison to previous seasons. For starters, he is seeing more fastballs and less breaking balls than he did in years past (2022: 57% FB, 26% BB ; 2021: 53.7% FB, 29.6% BB). The reason for the increase in fastballs could be due to the fact that in the 2021 season Yordan had a 19.6% PutAway percentage on the fastball. However, this season, that percentage has diminished to 12.1%. He has also chased a lot less pitches this year in comparison to years prior. Currently, Yordan sits a healthy 4.3% lower than his career average in Chase%. This directly correlates to his lowering of K% by 8.6%. With the strikeouts decreasing and the walks increasing, it is obvious that Yordan has made some adjustments to his approach and his plate discipline. But on top of that, he also has made an adjustment in the contact that he is making with the baseball as well. Neglecting Yordan’s 2020 season (only saw 35 pitches) in his other two active seasons he had an average launch angle of 13.75. This season, he has a launch angle of 11.1. His sweet spot percentage has stayed around the same 40% clip, but his HardHit% and Barrel% has dramatically increased with an increase in average Exit Velocity of 3 MPH. Hard hit ground balls and line drives almost always have a direct correlation with run production and overall success. All of this together has contributed to Yordan Alvarez being one of the most dangerous cleanup hitters in the Major Leagues.

    What Does the Future for Alvarez Look Like?

    As many Baseball fans are aware, the offseason was absurd. One big thing that was discussed during the meetings between the MLBPA and the MLB was the banning of the shift. If this were to happen, I am very intrigued in how Yordan Alvarez’s numbers could possibly look. Taking Statcast shift statistics into effect, it has been determined that Yordan has been shifted in 86.4% of his at bats this season. Luckily, this hasn’t effected his wOBA much due to the fact that it is a .437 with the shift vs a .434 without it. However, his groundball and pull percentages are a little bit higher this year than they normally are. Luckily enough for him, his weak contact percentage is 4 times lower than his career average. So, in essence, he is mashing balls straight into the shift and simply beating it. My question is what differential could there be in batting average for Yordan if a shift ban were to be implemented? Would he begin to see more backdoor breaking pitches to account for a less stout right side of the infield? Would his fastball percentage go down to account for the fact that there are no longer 4 people on the right side of the infield? Considering his Whiff % is very middle of the road in comparison to the rest of the league, what would that percentage end up looking like if he began to see less fastballs?

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    Final Thoughts on the Astros $115 Million Dollar Man

    At the end of the day, I do not think it is a stretch to state that Yordan Alvarez is one of the most dangerous hitters in the league at this current point in time. The adjustments that Yordan has made in his approach at the plate has directly contributed to his ability to strikeout less and get deeper into counts. This of course has allowed Yordan to get pitches that he is looking to do damage with which has led to 17 homeruns, a .314 batting average, and a .623 Slugging percentage.

    Oh, and lets not forget the fact that his average Exit Velocity is 96 MPH. If you are on the right side of the infield, watch your lips! And if you are the individual in the Dodgers front office that exchanged the keys to a Lamborghini for a Toyota Camry, I am sorry for your everyday agony.

    June 15, 2022
    MLB Baseball
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